New Jersey Institute of Technology

Digital Commons @ NJIT
Theses

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Fall 1-31-2013

Safety performance comparison between light rail transit and
subway
Nehemie Jasmin
New Jersey Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses
Part of the Civil Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Jasmin, Nehemie, "Safety performance comparison between light rail transit and subway" (2013). Theses.
141.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/141

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital
Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ NJIT. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu.

Copyright Warning & Restrictions
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.”
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user
may be liable for copyright infringement,
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order
would involve violation of copyright law.
Please Note: The author retains the copyright while the
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to
distribute this thesis or dissertation
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select
“Pages from: first page # to: last page #” on the print dialog screen

The Van Houten library has removed some of the
personal information and all signatures from the
approval page and biographical sketches of theses
and dissertations in order to protect the identity of
NJIT graduates and faculty.

ABSTRACT
SAFETY PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AND SUBWAY
by
Nehemie Jasmin

Along with the expansion and addition of guide way transit systems, such as light rail and
subway, there came the need to compare the safety performance of each mode. The
multimodal transportation systems with many different technologies, operating
characteristics and diversified environments made it more difficult to compare their
safety.
In order to evaluate the potential for intermodal comparison of safety performance
measures, the thesis has focused on the subway and Light Rail Transit (LRT) modes at
the national level. Starting with clear definitions of each safety category, the analysis
utilizes mostly the National Transit Database (NTD) from recent years to estimate the
impact and implications of various safety performance measures. A series of comparisons
between LRT and subway on various fatality, injury and property damage categories
demonstrates that accident rates may be unstable and easily distorted when the
operational base is small. With increasing number of operations, the accident rate may
become more predictable even if the simple numbers of accidents/incidents may still
appear random.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective
This study examines the safety performance of light rail and subway in the U.S. Increases
in traffic volumes, in light rail, have made the operating environment for rail transit more
difficult in recent years, leading to increased safety concerns and heightened levels of
risk. Examples of the types of transportation and land use factors influencing transit
safety include higher levels of pedestrian and bicycle traffic, increases in population and
employment density, and various “smart growth” design elements. Previous transit
industry safety research has provided considerable insights into the effects of human,
physical and environmental conditions on safety. Recent efforts to examine the influence
of operating environment on rail accident likelihood have been limited. As a result, the
relationship between operational characteristics and safety performance of rail transit
systems is not well understood.
Following are the objectives set out by the researcher for the present study:
1) To compare the safety performance of the light rail system and the subway
system (heavy rail) in USA
2) To examine and discuss the factors causing accidents in both systems
3) To suggest measures for preventing the occurrence of accidents in both
light and heavy rail
The purpose of this study is to examine the safety performance of Light Rail and
Subway in the U.S. The analysis of this study is designed to offer insights into potential
operations policies and practices that may be used or changed to improve rail operator
safety performance. Previous studies on this topic have specifically addressed the effects
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of operator demographics, factors contributing to operator stress and fatigue, various
measures of safety risk exposure (e.g., related to time and/or distance, passenger volumes
served), and route or vehicle characteristics representing potential safety hazards.

1.2 Problem Statement
Concerns about safety are central to transit system planning and delivery of service. The
incidence of transit crashes in the US has continued to rise steadily since 2003 and the
trend does not seem to show any signs of slowing down (FTA, 2009). The consequences
of injuries, fatalities and property damage resulting from crashes are serious problems
that continue to affect both the general public and transit agencies in the United States.
Over the last few years, transit ridership has been at or near 50-year highs primarily due
to increasing petroleum prices and a renewed focus on environmental sustainability.
During this time, many transportation service areas have also seen great levels of
economic development in the form of new housing, employment, and business centers.
For example, in 2012, the National Transit Database Safety and Security Module have
recorded more than 4000 collisions, 229 fatalities and more than 9000 injuries in 2011for
all transit combined (FTA, 2012). The historical trends of total fatality, injury and
incidents for the transit systems are increasing as shown in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1 Historical trends of transit safety, 2002-2011.

In recent years, the choice between light rail and heavy rail has been one of the
heated topics of debate on transport development, on which the present study focuses.
The proponents of heavy rail argue that heavy rail is more cost-effective as it carries
more passengers. According to 2009 estimates of American Public Transportation
Association (APTA), the subway based heavy rail carried around 3.5 billion trips for
around 16.8 billion passenger miles (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book). In
contrast, light rail carried passenger on only 465 million trips for 2.2 billion passenger
miles (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book). On the other hand, the supporters
of light rail system held that it is more costly to build a subway system than to start a
light rail system as the light rail system can run on existing roadways or cast-off rail
networks (Garrett 2004). Also, many light rail systems are automated which further
reduces the cost of an operator.
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The most recent FTA report indicates that while ridership has grown annually at a
relatively steady pace, the rail industry’s accident rate has risen at a greater rate (FTA,
2009). Similarly, the total value of property damaged in collisions has also continued to
rise steadily. An analysis of risk management and risk financing practices for a select
number of transit properties by Chaney and Derr (1996) found that accident losses
characterized as property damage or bodily injury to passengers, pedestrians or other
motorists were responsible for about 50% of the total risk cost. Similarly, Abacus
Technology Corporation (1996) also found that losses related to traffic accidents
involving collisions and passenger accidents accounted for about 51 percent of the total
risk cost and, on average, the total risk cost was 4.85 percent of a transit agency’s
operating expenses. The historical trends of fatality, injury and incident rate for the transit
systems are increasing as shown in Figure 1.2. The rate is per million PMT for all the
transit system combined.

Figure 1.2 Accident, injury and fatality rates 2002 – 2011.
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The rising costs of property in metropolitan cities have forced individuals to
relocate to the suburbs in order to find greater value in real estate. With the relocation of
families to the suburbs, more individuals rely on commuter rail or rapid transit as a means
to commute to work. Empirical data revealed when new transit lines are brought to
suppressed areas, property value increases (APTA, 2006). A number of other factors may
influence individuals to consider heavy rail transit as their primary form of transportation.
Economic factors include the rising cost of parking, major roadwork or repair,
serving the needs of economically disadvantaged individuals who cannot afford to
procure a motor vehicle, insurance premiums, and car maintenance. This includes both
the young and mature populations who do not operate a motor vehicle. As individuals
continue to move to the suburbs, many come to depend on public transportation due to
environmental concerns or because they belong to the aging population (APTA, 2006).
Since many patrons rely on heavy rail transit as their primary form of transportation, the
transit system needs to function optimally, reliably, and economically. The increase in
demand requires longer or additional trains for frequent service. Increasing train length or
frequency of service on any line requires that trains be more reliable to minimize any
failure during revenue service. The added service translates into higher maintenance costs
that must be controlled. Maintenance must optimally and efficiently be performed in
order to minimize failure during revenue service.
A careful review of data on safety performance of major surface transportation
modes reveal that US transit systems are relatively safe when compared to automobile
travel. Given the increasing trend of accident rates, there is a need for transit providers
and other agencies such as the FTA to take a more concerted and unified approach
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toward slowing down and possibly reversing this upward trend. The common approach
would be to undertake safety investment programs, but the challenge is ascertaining
where the focus should be and what level of safety resources to allocate.
Research has indicated that the nature of the accident, the causation and the effect
vary with respect to the mode of transportation (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact
Book). Since the rail transit system does not operate on a single mode of transportation,
safety performance of different types of rails are expected to vary. Light, commuter and
heavy rails are the three modes of transportation present in the US rail industry. Some
initial data comparing the number of accidents, the causation factors as well as the
injuries and economical loss in the accidents of these different modes of rail transit is
available (FTA, Safety Action Plan 20). However, a more detailed and comprehensive
inquiry is yet missing. The present study fills this knowledge gap by focusing on the
safety performance of light rail versus heavy rail. The study not only compares the
frequency of accidents, injuries and human and financial loss caused by these accidents
but also looks into the specific factors, with respect to both, within rail systems that cause
occurrence of these accidents. Furthermore, recommendations for the avoidance of such
accidents for both rail systems are also made.

1.3 Scope
The present study is focused on the comparison between safety performances of light rail
system versus subway system of the USA only. The findings produced in this thesis are
applicable directly to the rail transit system of USA but important lessons can be learnt
from it to apply in the rail transit system of other countries, as well. The accident data
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analyzed in this study is from 2002-2011; and the frequency of incidents and their causes
are identified for the accidents occurring only within this time period. With the time
constraint for this thesis, this is the analysis that the author has been used:
1. Prepare graphs comparing total number of accidents including all types of
incidents, fatalities, injuries.
2. Determine rate of incidents, fatalities, injuries, suicides and trespassers.
3. Determine rate of accidents/Passenger Miles Traveled (PMT) in millions.
4. Analyze the data, draw conclusion, and make policy recommendations.

1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review on Light
Rail and Subway system. This is followed by a complete Literature Review in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4 the safety incident frequency analysis are discussed. This is followed with
results, description and development of the preventability analysis model in Chapter 5. In
addition, this Chapter also presents and discusses factors that influence the likelihood of
preventable incident involvement and provides the concluding remarks, highlighting the
policy or management implications.

CHAPTER 2
LIGHT RAIL/ SUBWAY SYSTEM

2.1 Introduction
Rail transit system in USA can be divided into three types with respect to the design and
capacity. These types include heavy rail, commuter rail and light rail. Heavy rail operates
through the subway system which is mostly available in big cosmopolitan cities like New
York City, Boston and Chicago. It operated on completely exclusive guideway, with no
grade crossings for vehicles or pedestrians. Systems often support long trains of 6-8 cars,
and typically have level-platform boarding. Commonly called "subways" or "rapid rails"
while Commuter rail operates through rail-road tracks and connects the suburbs to the
main city centers. On the other hand, light rails can either use main roads as a trolley or
tram or can have a separate roadway as a multi-car train. It operates on local routes with
relatively frequent stops, and one or more grade crossings for vehicles or pedestrians.
Systems often use shorter trains of 2-4 cars, and are typically powered by overhead wires.
Light Rail includes both streetcars, and rapid light rail systems which may have extensive
stretches of exclusive guideways, including tunnels/subways (Garrett 2004).

2.2 Background
The public transportation system in the USA originated in the early 1800s. According to
Middleton, a famous urban transportation historian, the first public transport system in
USA consisted of horse-drawn carriages, called omnibuses that started transporting
public in New York City in 1827. However, soon the bad condition of the streets as well
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as the growing traffic congestion made the ride on these horse stagecoaches a difficult
one (Iles 2005). To solve this issue a transporter came with the idea of using rails instead
of streets for moving these horse cars (Middleton 2003). This led to the start of rail-transit
system in the USA. By the mid-19th century these horse-driven street or rail cars were
the only public transportation system in the USA (Middleton 2003). According to an
estimate, in 1880s there were around 400 rail-transit companies in the USA that were
providing services to around 180 million passengers annually using 6000 miles rail track
(Garrett 2004). The two other public transit systems that started in USA in the late-1880s
were cable car and electric streetcars (Garrett 2004)
Middleton reported that despite this phenomenal development in transit system
within the USA, the growing population in the main urban centers particularly New York
City was so high that omnibuses and streetcars failed to meet the public transit
requirements. In 1867, an entrepreneur Alfred Beach put forward the idea of elevated
train system in the New York City to resolve the congestion problem (Marten 2010). By
this time, subways system had already been started in many cities of Europe and inspired
from this system a number of innovators came up with the different subway’s or elevated
trains’ models, none of them got much attention or government approval. Later, the same
Alfred Beach succeeded in starting a pneumatic subway system in New York City but
again failed to finish it with success due to financial constraints. The attempts continued
until 1897, when the first electric underground street railway line was spread in the
Boston area (Marten 2010). In New York City, the elevated train system started in 1870
while the subway system started operation as late as 1904 (Garrett 2004). Table 2.1
represented numbers of cities in the U.S. in 2000 that have a rail system operated in them.
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Table 2.1 Rail-Transit Cities in the USA in 2000
Cities
Atlanta

Population in millions (2000
estimates)**
4.11

Rail-transit System
Heavy

Baltimore

2.55

Heavy, Light

Boston*

3.40

Heavy, Light, Commuter

Charlotte, N.C.*

1.50

Light

Chicago

8.27

Heavy, Commuter

Cleveland

2.25

Heavy, Light

Dallas

3.52

Light

Denver*

2 .11

Light

Detroit*

4.44

Light

Los Angeles

9.52

Heavy, Light, Commuter

Memphis, Tenn.*

1.14

Light

Miami

2.25

Heavy, Commuter

Minneapolis*

2.97

Light

New Orleans*

1.34

Light

New York City

9.31

Heavy, Commuter

Philadelphia*

5 .10

Heavy, Light, Commuter

Pittsburgh

2.36

Light

Sacramento, Calif.

1.63

Light

St. Louis

2.60

Light

San Diego*

2.81

Light, Commuter

Seattle*

2.42

Light

Washington, D.C.

4.92

Heavy, Commuter

Source: Light Rail Transit Association (www.lrta.org/index.html#top) and city transit web sites, as quoted
in Garrett 3
* All or part of the city’s light-rail system consists of streetcars.
** Population is for the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) and comes from the U.S. Census.
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Light rail transit came in the USA a little late. By 1972, North Americans were
not aware of this term, though some references to this concept have been made in 1960s
(Thompson 2012). The invention of the automobile in 1910s considerably reduced the
demand for streetcars in the 20th century and the only choice left for the transporters was
the heavy rail system. However, that option was much more costly and was not feasible
for many. A number of articles were published in the late 1990s in favor of transforming
the street car system with a rapid-transit system but it was not earlier than 1970s that
practical work started on the developed of light rail system (Thompson 2012). It was also
1972 when the term “light rail” was coined (Thompson 2012). It was 1981 when the first
light rail system started operating in the USA in San Diego (Thompson 2012). By now,
the two rail-transit systems are simultaneously operating in many cities of USA and is a
popular means of public transportation in these cities.

2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages for Having a Light Rail or Subway in Your City
The advantages of the light and heavy rail system can be understood well by seeing the
reasons that caused their advent. As described above, the subway system started in the
United States much earlier than the start of light-rail system. In the early 1990s, cities like
New York and Chicago faced serious traffic congestion problem due to the rapidly
growing population and increasing use of motor vehicles. When it became evident that
the city roads and streets did not have the capacity to hold the growing traffic, subway
system was introduced (Middleton 2003). The result was the transfer of traffic load from
the streets to underground subway system. People in those cities not only got more
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transportation options through the advent of this system but were also be able to reach
their destination in much less time with no congestion delays and parking issues.
Light-rail system, however, did not start in the main cities of USA but in the
suburbs, for the same reason of congestion. The reasons why the authorities did not build
subway system in those cities were both political and financial. Subway system had been
in operation since early 1900s but light-rail system made their debut in 1960s. Garrett
(2004) explained that public at that time was more environmentally conscious and was
aware of the pollution issues related to heavy rail system. Light rail system could relieve
not only the congestion issues but also the pollution. In addition, as explained by
Thompson (2003), development of light-rail system was more economical and thus, more
suiting for a wider application.
Marten (2012) has outlined a number of benefits of rapid transit system without
differentiating between the light and heavy rail system. According to Marten, the rapid
transit system is an economical option for transportation as the fuel prices are
continuously increasing. In addition, due to the growing property prices, people cannot
afford to live in metropolitan cities and are forced to relocate to the suburban areas. These
relocated people use rapid transit system to go to work. Other important benefits of using
public transportation are saving of parking and motor maintenance cost, saving of time
due to congestion and road repairs, and reduction in pollution. He also pointed out that
the these rapid transit systems offer an excellent transportation option for individuals who
cannot operate motors like disabled individuals, children and older citizens (Marten
2010).
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Litman (2012) conducted a comprehensible study on this subject. He found that
the cities in which rail transit is the main component of public transportation, the cost of
congestion per capita is substantially lower than in other cities (Litman 2012). He also
reported high transit ridership low, traffic death rates, low consumer expenditure on
transportation and high transit service cost in cities with rail systems as compared to
cities with none or less-developed rail system. The walking to the station is also found to
positively affect the health of individuals and cities as cities with established rail system
have improved individual health status. In terms of cost-efficiency, a number of scholars
have criticized the rail transit system because it utilizes a large sum from public subsidies
but Litman held that when considered with the inclusion of congestion cost, parking cost,
roadway cost, and consumer cost, the rail-transit system appears to be more costefficient.
However, the main disadvantage of using a rail transit system instead of a private
automobile is the loss of independence and privacy. Garrett argued that if people are
willing to pay extra cost on fuel, car registration, maintenance, parking and others, it
clearly shows that people value their independence and privacy more than the costs
associated with car ownership. Also, the rail transit system is not much flexible as it
operates on a defined route and following particular time schedule (Garrett 2005). Also,
the time spent on walking to the rail station and waiting has been criticized as one big
disadvantage that balances the time saved from congestion delays (Litman 2012).
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2.4 Operating Cost
The operating cost of a rail transit system in terms of the type of activity or function
performed includes cost of vehicle operation and maintenance, salaries of car operator
and other administrative staff and purchase of new vehicles. A comparison of operating
cost of light and heavy rail by type of function performed is shown in the table 2.2 below,

Table 2.2 Operating Costs of Heavy and Light Rails by Type of Activity Performed
Type of Operating Expense

Heavy Rail

Light Rail

Vehicle Operation

2775.7

549.7

Vehicle Maintenance

1133.2

260.5

Non-vehicle Maintenance

1552.0

221.4

788.5

266.9

61.2

111.4

6310.5

1409.9

General Administration
Purchased Transportation
Total
Source: APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book 21
 All costs are in millions of dollar

In terms of the type of goods and services performed, the operating cost includes
salaries, fringe benefits, cost of services, cost of materials and supplies, and others.
According to Garrett the salaries account for the highest operating cost in the light rail
system. APTA (2011 Public Transportation Fact Book) also reported the same results that
the salaries and other incentives for employees of transit agencies account for around
two-third of the total operating cost. The results of APTA’s 2011 report are shown in
Table 2.3.

15
Table 2.3 Operating Costs of Heavy and Light Rails by Type of Goods or Service
Purchased
Type of Operating Expense

Heavy Rail

Light Rail

Salaries and Wages

3160.5

528.7

Fringe Benefits

2467.4

361.2

Services

363.9

196.1

Materials and Supplies

421.7

91.1

Utilities

580.5

100.8

Casualty and Liability

128.3

22.9

Purchased transportation

61.2

111.4

Other

-873.1

-2.2

Total

6310.5

1409.9

Source: APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book21
 All costs are in millions of dollar

The revenue to cover this operation cost comes either from the passenger fares or
from the federal or local government funding. Garrett held that most of the operating cost
is covered through public tax and only 30% of the revenue is generated by the fares.
(APTA 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book) reported the figure of 37% which is
almost same. The 2009 estimates of annual passenger fares for heavy rail were $3,801
million and for light rail were $390.6 million (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact
Book). Therefore, on average, passenger fare covers around 60% of operating cost in
heavy rail and only 27% in light rail system. Thus, light-rail system appears to be less
cost-efficient as compared to heavy rail system.
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The operating cost of a rail system depends considerably on the size of system
and the area of operation and consequently there are marked differences in the operating
costs of different rail systems of USA. A better approach to use operating cost as a
measure of efficiency is to compare the operating cost per passenger or per vehicle mile.
Table 2.4 below compares the efficiency of the heavy and light rail system using this
approach.
Table 2.4 Cost-Efficiency of Light Rail and Heavy Rail
Light Rail

Heavy Rail

Operating Cost

6310.5

1409.9

Passenger Miles

16,805

2,199

Vehicle Miles

684.6

90.7

Operating Cost per Passenger

0.38

0.64

9.22

15.54

Miles
Operating Cost per Vehicle Miles


APTA’s 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book

2.5 Transit Safety Management and Safety Performance Measurement
According to the report of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), one important
cause of rail accidents is the limitation in the safety management system of rail agencies
(GAO 2011). The important limitations in the safety management system, identified in
the report, were problems in the safety rule and procedure defined by the transit agencies
and the inadequacy of proper system to ensure that the defined rules and procedures are
followed by the employees. For instance, in one incidence it was found that the agency’
rules and procedures lacks details of wayside personal security that led to the fatality of

17
one employee while working on a track (GAO 2011). Similarly, in another incidence, it
was found that the train operator failed to follow the controlling signal indication as he
was napping at that moment (GAO 2011).
FTA has recently taken action to ensure the development of effective safety
management system in all urban transit agencies. In 2006, FTA prepared a Rail Transit
Safety Action Plan with the purpose to identify the most common causes of rail transit
accidents and to find ways to deal with these common causes (Safety Action Plan 3).
Analysis of rail accidents that occurred from 2005 to 2005 showed that the most common
type of accidents was collisions, of which the most common category was the collision of
rail with the motor vehicle at rail grade crossing (FTA 2006). It was found that of the 371
total accidents, the probable cause of 225 accidents was not identifiable due to the lack of
information (FTA, 2006 Safety Action Plan 20). This clearly shows the weakness in the
accident reporting and data management system of transit agencies.
Different causes were identified for the collision accidents in light rail and heavy
rail. In light rail collision, most common cause was the “illegal, inappropriate or risky
actions” of motor vehicle’s driver and pedestrians. Although, for around 12% of incidents
the rail operator was found responsible while for 5% cases there was clear violation of
operating rules. In heavy rail collisions, the violation of operating rules was more
frequent and most of the collisions occurred due to this factor. Operator fatigue and
inattentiveness was found to cause five of the 36 heavy rail collisions. Violation of
operating rules and procedures was also found to cause derailments and rail fires.
Based on these finding FTA proposed a plan in which the first priority was given
to the reduction of collision accidents (The Top ten priorities for the Safety Action Plan
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are listed in Table 2.5). For reduction of collision, FTA planned to improve the rail grade
crossing and to use research finding of FTA and other agencies for improving the safety
of pedestrians and trespassers. As incompliance with operating rules was found to be an
important cause, FTA revised the State Safety Oversight rule to ensure that all rail transit
agencies integrate the compliance with operating and maintenance rules in their
respective System Safety Program Plans (FTA, Safety Action Plan 41).
APTA has also taken steps for the establishment of effective safety management
system for the urban rail transit industry of USA. It has recently published a Manual as a
guidebook for the development of effective safety management system for urban rail
transit. The objective of this manual is not only to assist the transit agencies that are
member of APTA in developing their safety management system but it also defines the
criteria for the APTA safety management audit program.
According to this manual, the first step for the development of safety management
system is to fulfill the administrative requirements for safety management that include
planning a specific course of action for safety management process and timely review of
the process to ensure that the safety goals are being met (APTA, Manual for Urban
Transit Safety Management System Section 3.0). APTA held that in this initial phase of
planning and organization for safety management system, the rail transit agency should
give explicit information about the operational structure of urban rail system along with
its specific safety requirements, an approved and attested safety policy statement, identify
the administrative body having authority to manage and monitor the safety management
system, define goals and objectives for safety management, and develop a strategic plan
for achieving that specified goals and objectives (Section 3.0).
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The second phase of safety management system development, according to
APTA’s Manual for Urban Transit Safety Management System (Section 4.0), is the
implementation of the safety program. One important element of this implementation
process is the maintenance of rail infrastructure by assuring the access and availability of
safety-related equipment and frequent inspection of equipment to report the defective or
missing items. The inspection and repair of the vehicle is another important feature for
assuring the safety of the transit system. The operating and administrative staff should be
trained for safety management and the safety policies should be reviewed on regular
basis. The safety management program should include an emergency management
program as well as a workplace safety program. For contracted service, there should be
safety-related clauses in the contract. In addition the rail transit agencies should also take
measure for assuring the safety of passengers and trespassers. APTA Manual also held
that the safety of operating rail corridor is the most important element of safety
management program due to the increasing number of accidents on rail grade crossing
and of roadway workers and trespassers. The manual also proposed measures for
prevention of suicide accidents. Furthermore, APTA also consider the recent issues of
environmental safety and sustainable development to be important and held that the rail
transit agencies should be held accountable for the environmental impacts of their transit
operations (Section 4.0).
The third and very important section of safety management system is related to
the engineering practices and analysis (APTA, Manual for Urban Transit Safety
Management System Section 5.0). The identification of system risk, their measurement
and control is at the core of safety management system and should be given important
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considerations. APTA identified five important elements related to engineering technique
and analysis namely, risk reduction, hazard management, accident reporting and
investigation system, reliable data collection and authentic analysis, and loss prevention
and control mechanism including the analysis of fire safety and causality management
(Section 5.0).
The last important area that ought to be covered by the safety management system
of the rail transit agency is the safety assurance by adoption of change management and
performance measurement systems (APTA, Manual for Urban Transit Safety
Management System Section 6.0). APTA suggested the use of configuration management
for analyzing the impact of change along with reference to FTA safety standards, regular
inspection and timely system modification, and use of existing quality control program
for safety assurance. Transit agencies should also obtain certification for their security
management systems from FTA and should also review the safety performance in case of
any system modification. There should also be a proper document management system in
the rail transit agencies. Most importantly, the transit agencies should adopt a reliable
safety performance measurement system including both internal and external audit
programs (Section 6.0).

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to have an understanding of transportation safety performance, performance
management, as well as our choice for case study, series of literature reports analyzed and
provided a great deal of information needed to begin building our comparative analysis.
A detailed literature search revealed uneven coverage on the safety performance
measures and research. That is, there are a large number of research papers, data sources,
and methodologies for highway safety /crash analyses but very limited research and data
sources for transit safety performance measures.

3.1 Public Transportation Ridership Trends
Heavy rail transit systems have grown in popularity for several reasons (APTA, 2006).
Patrons rely on public railway transit systems primarily because of the increasingly high
cost of automobile fuel, traffic congestion, escalating property costs, and environmental
concerns, as well as the systems’ convenience and efficiency (APTA, 2006; Capital
Corridor, 2007; Celik & Yankaya, 2006). The public transportation ridership trend
illustrated in Figure 1 clearly illustrates the trends and importance of transit to the United
States since the early 1900s (APTA, 2006).
According to APTA (2006), various social and economic factors have affected the
popularity of public transportation. In the beginning of the 20th century, ridership grew at
a steady rate until the Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1939, ridership declined
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(APTA), which was directly attributed to the loss of jobs and lack of money. The patron
ridership increased again during World War II, when public transport became the main
mode of transportation in many urban areas. Ridership peaked in 1946 with more than
23.4 billion trips reported on trains, buses, and trolleys.

3.2 The Conceptual / Theoretical Frameworks
Human capital theory has empirically been tested and supported by a number of rail
industry safety studies (Rodriguez et al. 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2003; Monaco and
Williams, 2000). For example, Rodriguez et al. (2003) found that human capital,
occupational and compensation factors were important predictors of crash frequencies.
A careful review of empirical studies in the large area of safety reveals that
application of human capital theory has been used in rail industry safety analysis only to
a limited scale. In general, there seems to be no consensus on one unified theory of
accident occurrences. However, it is also evident that the traditional subway–based
empirical framework has most often been adapted and applied to rail transit safety
research at both industry and firm levels.
The conventional subway-based empirical approach treats occurrences of subway
or commercial vehicle accidents as being the result of the interaction between the driver,
vehicle, and environmental conditions (Jovanis, 1989; Jovanis, 1986). Evidence suggests
that empirical studies that have used this approach have had a driver focus, in part
because human error is recognized as the key determinant of commercial vehicle
accidents (Jovanis, 1989). Whereas this empirical framework is useful, still it cannot
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directly be applied to rail transit accident analysis because of the complications that are
inherent and specific in the transit industry.
There are features which are unique to rail transit and have no parallel structure in
the traditional subway safety field. First, there is the risk of an accident in rail transit
which is affected in part by transit service characteristics and by agency policy
environment in addition to the traditional factors of human, vehicle, subway and
environmental conditions, such as, weather and lighting factors. Second, passenger
injuries resulting from non-collision incidents are also a major concern in the transit
industry. In particular, injuries to transit passengers occur in non-collision incidents,
especially while the vehicle is accelerating or decelerating (Wahlberg, 2007), and during
boarding and alighting processes (Morlok et al., 2004; Hudenski, 1992).
Prior research on rail safety performance has mainly been examined at two-levels
of analysis; system and route–levels. The system level approach is used where the goal of
the analysis is to investigate factors that are important in safety and to provide broad level
indicators of safety performance (Chang and Yeh, 2005; Jovanis et al. 1991). Beyond the
big picture or safety performance indicators, route level designs are used in determining
geometric and other non-behavioral factors that contribute to crash incidents (Jovanis et
al. 1991; Chimba et al. 2010). Data in route-level design are organized around the
individual routes or network facility segments. As observed in the studies by Jovanis et
al. and Chimba et al., the route-based design approach is limited to the sample of
operators who are involved in incidents and consequently, information on those without
incidents is not recovered. In addition, behavioral factors are not captured in the route
based designs.
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In contrast to earlier safety research, the present study examines the contributing
factors to rail safety using the operator signup based approach. This approach is
consistent with Evans (2004) perspective that efforts to improve safety should focus on
human behavior. Similarly, FTA (2009) policy paper on rail safety improvement
strategies recommends that the focus should be to identify and assess effects of factors
that are within transit agency control.

3.3 Urban Transportation in America
The history of rapid transit began with the first transit system, which consisted of
stagecoaches pulled by horses. Over time, horses were replaced with other motive
sources such as pneumatic, steam, cable, and electricity. Middleton (2003), a rapid transit
historian, reported that the first urban transit system in North America appeared in New
York City in 1827, consisting of horse-drawn stagecoaches.
By 1832, the New York City stagecoaches were replaced by horse-drawn
streetcars. The congestion on the street from the horse-drawn streetcars, pedestrians, and
private stagecoaches, became a concern for the growing city (IIes, 2005). Middleton
reported that an innovator named Alfred Beach, in 1867, proposed to resolve the
congestion problem on New York City streets with a pneumatic subway, which he
subsequently designed and built. His pneumatic subway used air to power the trains
under street level, avoiding the use of conventional steam engines. Beach’s innovation
used 10-foot fans located at each end of the subway to propel the train along the subway
line. Middleton (2003) went on to report that in 1866, William Hemstreet built a transit
system that was elevated 30 feet above the busy streets of New York City. The elevated
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railway transit system operated for the next two decades. Middleton posited that since the
introduction and subsequent abandonment of the pneumatic subway in 1870, other
innovators proposed, designed, and built different configurations of railway transit
systems.
Since the 1900s, several transit designs have used subway, elevated tracks, and atgrade guide ways. Designs incorporated pneumatic, steam, complex cable, and electricity
to propel the trains. While each of the propulsion systems offer advantages and
disadvantages, pneumatic and steam solutions have been largely abandoned, while cable
remains suitable for limited situations.
Since the introduction of Beach’s rapid transit system, many forms of
underground (e.g., subway) and elevated railway transit systems have been constructed.
After 1900, railway rapid transit increased in popularity and eventually replaced the
horse- and mule-drawn carriages.

3.4 The Empirical Findings
Turning to the specific factors and how they are related to accident rates and frequencies,
evidence is clear that numerous factors play roles in accident occurrences. These factors
have been well identified in the empirical framework conceptualized by Jovanis et al.
(1991) and they are consistent with the human capital theoretical framework (Rodriguez
et al. 2003; Monaco and Williams, 2000).
In general, traffic safety literature has found negligent driver behavior to be the
principal cause of crashes. Evans (2004), for example, summarizes the findings of two
large independent studies undertaken in the U.S. and U.K. Analyzing the details of
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thousands of crash records, both studies found driver behavior to be either the sole or
contributing cause of over 90% of crashes. The principal causes of the remaining crashes
were identified as vehicle failures (e.g., brakes and tires), environmental factors (e.g,
weather and lighting), and roadway factors (e.g., design and condition).

3.5 Safety Culture in Rail Transit System
Rail transit system is relatively safer than travelling through other modes of transport
(Nelson and Streit 2011). Statistics shows the probability of accident in motor vehicles is
much higher than the probability of in rail (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2011). In
2009, some 5,505,000 accidents occur on the road while 3,807 accidents occur on the
railroad (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2011). However, the loss of life and property
in the recent rail incidents has called for the need to make necessary action so this loss
can be avoided in future. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has conducted
investigation on these accidents and has outlined a number of factors that contributed to
these rail accidents (Government Accountability Office 2011).
One important contributing factor, mentioned by the NTSB, is the lack of safety
culture in the transit agencies, which according to Government Accountability Office
(GAO) is a “challenge that largest transit agencies face”. One very basic problem
regarding the establishment of safety culture in the rail transit agencies is that there is no
universally accepted definition of safety culture. Reason has explained that the literature
on safety culture has defined it usually in two ways: “as something an organization is (the
beliefs, attitudes and values of its members regarding the pursuit of safety), and as
something that an organization has (the structures, practices, controls and policies
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designed to enhance safety).” Thus, safety culture is a combination of the organizational
values, policies and practices regarding the establishment of safety. In the APTA Manual
for Urban Rail Safety Management System, safety culture has been defined as:
“The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies,
and patterns of behavior that can determine the commitment to and the style and
proficiency of an organization’s Safety Management System” (APTA, 2011 Manual for
Urban Transit Safety Management System).
The safety culture has been reported to vary in different rail transit agencies
(GAO 2011). However, all in all, the degree of safety culture in transit agencies is
considered as low and there is need to bring changes in the behavior and commitment of
employees as well as values and culture of organization to develop the safety culture in
the rail transit industry as a whole (GAO 2011). APTA has recently set the development
of safety culture in the urban rail transit agencies to be one of its prime goals (APTA,
2011 Manual for Urban Transit Safety Management System).
One important element of the safety culture that has been found missing in the rail
transit system of USA is the reporting culture, which is claimed by Reason (1998) to be
the most difficult to achieve. In a report by Federal Railroad Administration (FRA 2005),
it was found that among the 543 reportable grade crossing accidents that occurred from
May 2003 to December 2004 and caused 116 fatalities, only 115 (21%) were
immediately reported. The delay in the required immediate reporting to FRA resulted in
the difficulty for FRA to decide whether or not to conduct investigation on that accident.
Reason (1998) identified that the main reason for the lack of reporting culture is
because the driver and other employee of rail transit agencies are fearful of reporting their
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own mistakes. Thus, when FRA (2005) investigated the issue, it was found that in many
cases employees were actually confused due to the unclear regulation regarding the
reporting of rail road accidents. It was noted that most of such unreported cases involved
fatalities of non-passengers. As per FRA regulation, railroads are not required to
immediately inform FRA about the occurrence of accidents that involves injury of nonpassengers. However, if any of the non-passengers died after accidents, they are required
to report the matter immediately. They noted that in many cases the non-passengers died
when they had been taken from the accident scene to the hospital and as a result, railroad,
unaware of the fatality, did not report the accident immediately (FRA 2005).
The different measures suggested by FTA officials for improvement of safety
culture are giving proper safety training to staff, evaluation of the current status of safety
management system, and reliable and valid measurement of safety performance (GAO
2011). According to APTA, development of safety culture in an organization can be
achieved through three stages
1. “Stage 1: Safety is based on rules and regulations.
2. Stage 2: Safety is considered as an organizational goal.
3. Stage 3: Safety can always be improved” (Manual for Urban Transit
Safety Management System Sec 3.3.2)

To find out at which stage of safety culture development a transit agency is at
present, multiple methods, including employee surveys and interviews, focus group
discussion, observation of the process employed for handling of conflicts and focus on
the safety defense, should be used (APTA, 2011 Manual for Urban Transit Safety
Management System Sec 3.3.3).
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3.6 Factors beyond Transit Management Control
Turning to factors specifically related to design and other related conditions, there is clear
evidence indicating that the effect of these factors on crash activity depends in part on the
type of the variable and how the given variable is entered in the estimation model.
Railway segments or zones with higher average posted speed limits are consistently
associated with fewer accident occurrences (Jovanis et al. 1991 ).
This relationship is, however, counter-intuitive and has been explained in various
ways. Some authors have argued that high speed railway tracks are likely to be well
designed, carry small traffic volumes and have fewer stations and are therefore relatively
safer ( Jovanis et al. 1991). The challenge is that such routes allowing faster travel may
be safer but might not be preferred for transit operations if fewer patrons exist.
Alternatively, higher speed limit may mean lower spacing between intersections and thus
less opportunity for conflicts.
Shoulder width and travel lane width have mixed effects on accident occurrence.
The effect and magnitude of each of these variables depend on whether the factor is
entered in the estimation model as a continuous or as a dummy variable. For example,
Shankar et al. (1997) showed that when defined as categorical or dummy variables, travel
lane and shoulder width have positive and significant effects on crash frequency.
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In the organizational safety literature, human factors are widely studied using
psychology and engineering perspective. However, in some recent studies, this human
factors approach has been adopted to study the public safety issues with regard to road
and rail traffic accidents (Baysari et al. 2009; Greig & Hopkins 2011; Petridou &
Moustaki 2000).
With regard to the road accidents, a recent study was conducted in Britain in
which it was highlighted that human factors such as drivers’ or passengers’ human errors
play a vital role in the occurrence of road accidents (Greig & Hopkins 2011). The study
further found that the age of driver is significantly associated with certain factors that
cause these accidents (Greig & Hopkins 2011). After reviewing the studies on human
factors association with traffic accidents, Petridou & Moustaki reached the conclusion
that in Europe around 90% of traffic accidents are caused by human factors.
In the research related to rail accident, there was little attention to these human
factors. It is just few years back when researcher started realizing the importance of these
factors and inspired from the convincing findings of studies on other modes of transport,
conduct studies on finding rail human factors (Wilson & Norris 2006). One important
area of research with regard to human factors in rail accident causation is on the rail
operator’s behavior. Baysari (2009) adopted the human factors approach to analyze 19
rail accidents in Australia and found that the main human factor related to these accidents
was the “slip of attention of rail operators.” Driver’s lacks of motivation or fatigue due to
over workload or low compensation are also highlighted in a number of studies (Cotteril
& Jones 2005; Gouin et al. 2006). Ashton and Fowler (203) suggested using human
friendly roosters for the reduction of the impact of fatigue ( Kecklund et al. 2006)

31
believed that the one important way to reduce the driver error is by giving attention to
the details of driving job like wage, workload, job aids etc. They held that the workload
on the rail drivers should be kept at a moderate level as high or low workload can
increase the probability of driver error.
Petridou & Moustaki (2000) have classified the human factors related to drivers
into two main branches, first the factor that affect the driving ability of the driver and
second the factors that led to risky and careless behavior of the driver. They further
divided these two types of factors with respect to the long-term and short-term impact.
According to their review, the factors that produce long term impact on the drivers’
ability to drive safely include their lack of experience, old age, any disability or disease,
accident proneness, and alcoholism and drug abuse (Petridou & Moustaki 2000). The
factors that produce short-term or temporary impact on driving ability are fatigue, high
alcohol intoxication, temporary drug effects, overeating, acute psychological stress, and
temporary distraction ( Petridou & Moustaki 2000). Similarly, overconfidence on driving
abilities, habit of over-speeding, law-breaking habit, indecent driving attitude, wrong
sitting posture while driving, disuse of seat belt or helmet, accident proneness and
alcoholism are factor that produce long-term impact on risk-taking behavior of driver
while moderate intake of ethanol, intake of psychotropic drugs, motor vehicle crimes,
attraction to suicide and other compulsive acts are responsible for short-term risky
behavior of drivers (Petridou & Moustaki 2000).
Another important area of research is related to the response of driver to the
danger signals. Studies have attempted to find better signals system to grab attention of
driver and to ensure his timely recognition and response to these transmitted signals
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(Collis & Schmid 2001; Pasquini et al.2004). Tools have also been developed to identify
the risk of accidents due to the single passing at danger (SPADs) (Holywell 2005; Lowe
& Turner 2005).
With the improvement of technology used in the rail operation, the nature of rail
human factors will be changed. Moreover, as identified by Wilson and Norris, there is
growing centralization in the rail functions which will also influence the role of drivers
and their responsibilities. Another important change that has been witnessed in past few
years is the increase in ridership (APTA, 2011 Public Transportation Fact Book 10)
because of which rail transit agencies want to increase the number of rails (Wilson &
Norris 2006). With the increase in the rail number the information about their route and
time schedule will become more complex and research will have to examine the human
factors associated with management of complex and large amount of information.

3.7 Need for Safety Performance Measurement
GAO reported that the main reason why transit agencies are facing difficultly in
developing safety culture is their inability to measure the safety performance of their
agency. The safety performance data collected by them and the analysis conducted by
them is often flawed which make it difficult to identify the main causes of safety hazards
(GAO 2011). The report mentioned that the data present in the FTA’s Safety Database is
not reliable as there are unsubstantiated figures, repeated entries, entries that were not
matching with each other, and other issues with measurement.
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The report clearly highlighted the importance of having an effective and reliable
safety performance measurement system as without it, it is difficult for FTA to decide the
level of improvement in the agencies as well as to identify and curtail the issues that can
breach the safety measures (GAO 2011). Safety performance can also enable FTA to set
specific safety performance goals for the rail transit agencies and make informed decision
for reducing the rail accidents in future (GAO 2011).
APTA also consider safety performance measurement to be an important factor
and have defined the phase of safety performance measure and assessment to be one of
the main stages for the development of safety management system suggested by them for
the urban rail transit agencies (Manual for Urban Transit Safety Management System
Section 2.2.3). The report held that safety performance measurement help in
benchmarking the safety performance of rail transit agencies and in identifying the
pattern and level of progress of different rail transit agencies.

3.8 Summary
The literature review also reveals a number of limitations to prior studies on rail
transit accident analysis. First, there are no studies that have comprehensively examined
the operational determinants of rail transit accidents at the operator signup level. Second,
the influence of employment status, assigned work, work performance abilities and
customer feedback on the expected frequencies of bus collision and non-collision has not
been quantitatively determined. Third, there is no study that has used data recovered
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from Transit ITS technologies and related systems to develop an operator-based safety
incident model that can help in identifying and assessing the effect of factors that
contribute to the likelihood of preventable incident involvement and occurrence of transit
bus safety incidents.
The findings from the empirical literature review reveal that prior empirical
studies specifically examining rail crashes primarily addressed the effects of operator
demographics, factors contributing to operator stress and fatigue, various measures of
safety risk exposure and route or vehicle characteristics representing potential safety
hazards. The importance of operational characteristics has also been recognized by
researchers (Jovanis et al., 1991). Due to data limitations and research design issues,
these studies could not directly model the likelihood of preventable incident involvement
and crash frequencies at the operator level.

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Transit Safety Data Sources
The primary data source for this paper is from National Transit Database (NTD) report.
NTD is the Federal Transit Administration's primary national database for statistics on
the transit industry (National Transit Database, 2011). It was established by Congress to
be the nation’s primary source for information and statistics on the transit system of the
United State. Basically, our data includes operating information of number of vehicles,
passenger miles traveled, vehicle revenue miles, vehicle revenue hours and incidents
information on total incidents, total fatalities and injuries, etc. The database provides us
information from 2002 to 2011 which include all kinds of transportation modes in the
US. For this research purpose, Subway and Light Rail’s data has been used for the entire
United State.
According to National Transit Database, there are some limitations that need to
consider before using the data. Data quality and completeness have improved
significantly over time. The safety & security data collection was introduced as a pilot
program in 2002. Over time, most transit properties developed new internal data
collection and processing methods to meet the new requirements. These developments,
combined with the implementation of more sophisticated validation checks by FTA, have
resulted in more complete and accurate data in more recent years.
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These data have created an opportunity to explore a new dimension of safety- the transit
operating environment. Previous research could not systematically and comprehensively
address this dimension due to data limitations and research design complications.
After the close of a month, transit properties have one month to compile and
submit data to the NTD. Upon submission, NTD Analysts review submissions for data
completeness and reasonableness and request revisions where appropriate. To allow for
this validation process, this Time Series includes a 90 day lag before publishing reported
safety and security data. Therefore, January data is not published until the May release of
the Safety & Security Time Series File. Additionally, transit properties may revise their
data at any time during the calendar year reporting cycle, which lasts through March 1 of
the subsequent year. These changes may be done unilaterally by the transit property, as
the transit property collects additional data on its operations and these changes will be
reflected in subsequent release of the Safety & Security Time Series.
This Time Series includes service data collected through the NTD Annual
Module. Because closeout of the Annual Module occurs after closeout for the Safety &
Security Module, the Time Series file may incorporate the previous years’ service data
for 1 or 2 of the most current Time Series data sheets. The Time Series data sheets will
include a notation if such an adjustment has been made.
A transit agency that directly operates some of its motorbus service and contracts
out for the rest of its motorbus service will have two separate lines for motorbus service,
one for the directly operated component and another for the purchased transportation
component. The same principle holds true for a transit agency that contracts out its
service that was previously directly operated. The service will appear on two different
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lines, depending on whether it was directly operated or purchased transportation.

4.2 Safety Management Information Statistics Database (SMIS)
Transit agencies have been collecting safety‐related data for more than three decades.
Over 750 of the nation’s public transportation providers submit safety data to the
National Transit Database (NTD) program routinely by service mode These data are used
by the FTA to construct metrics and track trends of the overall safety performance of the
transit industry (FTA, 2012).
The quality and completeness of accident/incident data reported by transit
agencies affect the understanding of the safety of the U.S. transit industry and
consequently how safety resources are targeted. The reported data usually come from
accident, incident, or police reports and are used to complete the major incident report
form (S&S‐40) and the non‐major incident summary report form (S&S‐50) required by
the FTA. The information contained in these forms is entered into the National Transit
Database (NTD), which also contains financial and operating data for public
transportation systems in the U.S.
The NTD underwent a major redesign for calendar year 2002 (FTA, 2005). The
NTD now incorporates a web-based, monthly, and two-tiered safety and security incident
collection mechanism. The injury definition was changed for the 2002 revision of the
NTD to coincide with other USDOT modes. A redesign of the NTD for calendar year
2002 resulted in the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Rail Accident/Incident
Reporting System (RAIRS) now the source of commuter rail safety data (FTA, 2005).
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For NTD electronic reporting purposes, transit operators collect data on four major
categories of transit accidents:
1. collisions,
2. derailments/buses going off the road,
3. personal casualties, and
4. fires.
These major categories are divided into subcategories. For example, the collisions
category comprises collisions with vehicles, objects, and people except suicides. Transit
agencies report fatalities, injuries, accidents, incidents, and property damage in excess of
a specified dollar amount.

4.3 State Safety Oversight Agency Data
In response to Congressional concern regarding the potential for accidents and incidents
on rail transit systems, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
(ISTEA) added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330.
This section requires the FTA to issue a regulation creating the first state-managed
oversight program for rail transit safety.
State Safety Oversight Agency (SSO) agencies are required to submit data
annually to the FTA on transit accident and hazard investigations including date, type of
accident, number of injuries, number of fatalities, probable cause, property damage, and
type of individuals injured, such as passenger or worker. These annual data submissions
are manually entered into a template that the SSO agencies submit to the FTA. The FTA
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recommends, but does not require, SSO agencies to provide internal tracking numbers
assigned to each accident; not all SSO agencies do so.
To allow for the individuality of reporting agencies, the FTA allows each agency
to develop its own reporting format, including items such as accident cause
classifications. Some agencies have indicated that they would prefer to report using a
standardized form. In response, the FTA has developed the SSO Annual Reporting
Template, which is fully acceptable for Annual Certification and may help streamline the
process.
In addition to the two primary sources, other entities, such as departments of
public safety, police departments, city/county/state transportation and traffic departments,
and universities, may also provide some of the necessary data. For instance, local public
works departments and state departments of transportation are good sources of traffic
data (traffic volumes, traffic speeds, inventories of traffic control devices, traffic signal
timing information, and so forth). The geographic information systems (GIS) maintained
by local planning organizations can be very helpful in analyzing data spatially.

4.4 Comparative Analysis
The total number of incidents, injuries and fatalities for Subway (HR) and Light rail (LR)
from 2002 to 2011 are included in historical trends for subway and light rail below. 4.1
show the incident data comparison between Subway and light rail. From 2002 to 2008,
incidents related to Light Rail are of much larger amount than incidents related to
Subway; however, incidents from Subway from 2009 to 2011 has been increase to the
point that it surpasses Light Rail. For light rail, the average amount of incidents during
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these 10 years is 312 per year. However, the average amount of incidents related to
Subway is 239 per year.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the difference in injuries from Subway and Light Rail from
2002 to 2011. Total injuries data shows that Light Rail had caused far more injuries than
Subway, with around 274 a year compared to around 232 a year for Subway. From 2007
to 20011, the injuries caused by Light Rail and Subway increase and the injuries caused
by Subway is almost double the one caused by Light Rail from 2020 to 2011.
Figure 4.3 analyzes how the fatalities caused by Subway are related to Light Rail.
Total fatalities caused by Subway are far greater than fatalities caused by Light Rail. For
light rail, the average of fatalities during these 10 years is 20 per year, but the average
amount of fatalities related to Subway is 59 per year.

Figure 4.1 Total incidents from 2002 to 2011 for light rail and subway.
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Figure 4.2 Total injuries from 2002 to 2011 for light rail and subway.

Figure 4.3 Total fatalities from 2002 to 2011 for light rail and subway.

The operating statistics of each mode shows total passenger miles traveled (PMT),
total vehicle revenue miles (VRM) and total vehicle revenue hours (VRH) for each mode
respectively. The author can conclude from these figures that from 2002 to 2011,
numbers for each category have increased. On the other hand, for the three factors above,
Subway had far more than light rail. The average PMT per year for Subway is
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15,019,416,633 and 1,857,140,694 for Light Rail; the average VRM per year for Subway
is 89 Million and 44 Million for Light Rail; and the average VRH per year for Subway is
15 Million and 4 Million for Light Rail. According national transit database (NTD), the
data used to count the VRH as train (train revenue hours) prior to 2008 (all vehicles in
one train), but after 2008, NTD started to count it as vehicle revenue hours. Each train
has in average 8 vehicles so that is why after 2008 the VRH is so high. Despite the much
safer performance, public transit has not been cast in a positive light when it comes to
safety measures (see Figures 4.4 to 4.6). One simple explanation is that VRM is not the
proper conversion to measure safety performance for all modes. One transit vehicle may
carry 20 to 100 riders while the average occupancy rate for private vehicles in the US is
less than two (2). The Passenger Miles Traveled (PMT) may be a better conversion unit
but not all modes collect such data. For example, the metrics collected by the official
source, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, US Department of Transportation, measure
the fatality rate for air travel per 100 million aircraft miles, for waterborne mode
numbered boats and train miles for railroad mode.

Figure 4.4 Total passenger miles traveled by each mode between 2002 and 2011.
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Figure 4.5 Total revenue miles traveled by each mode between 2002 and 2011.

Figure 4.6 Total vehicle revenue hours by each mode between 2002 and 2011.

It is clear that when compared to other modes, particularly automobiles, the safety
performance of public transportation is often distorted due to inadequate unit conversions
or calculation bases. This arises, in part, because of the differences in how safety
performance is defined and measured among transportation modes and because of the
inherent differences in the operating environments of the different modes. In addition,
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some of the comparisons of aggregate national safety statistics and performance measures
of different transportation modes can be misleading and may, in fact, distort the safety
performance record of a particular mode.
The disparity between the safety performance and public perceptions of various
transportation modes may have hampered the viability of transit services. Given the
discrepancies and misperceptions of existing safety performance measures, the public
transit industry is in urgent need of recognizing, addressing, and improving a safety
performance comparison among transportation modes.
Transit incidents, fatalities and injuries vary considerable from year to year,
especially when viewed alone, without consideration to the volume of ridership. Figure
4.7 shows the incidents rate per million passenger miles traveled; we figure out that from
2003 to 2005 there was an increase in the incident rate for Light Rail; thus, it was
decreased from 2005 to 2006. From 2007 to 2011, the incident rate for Light Rail
increased. The incidents rate for Subway was relatively low, but started to increase in
2008.
The true pictures of transit safety for various modes start to emerge when the
simple accident or fatality numbers are converted into various operating contexts. For
example in Figure 4.8, the injuries rate per million PMT for Light Rail is much higher
than the rate for Subway. From 2003 to 2005, the injury rate increased for Light Rail; the
rate started to decrease between 2005 and 2006. However, the injury rate started to
increase after 2006 and now passengers have the highest rate of getting injured ever
before and it was at his highest peak in 2011. For the Subway, the injury rate went up and
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down almost every year until 2007 where it started to increase every year but at a lower
rate than the Light Rail.
As shown in Figure 4.9, the fatality rate per PMT for Light Rail is higher than the
Subway. From 2002 to 2004, there were an increase in passenger fatality rate for Light
Rail but started to decrease from 2004 to 2006. Since 2006, the fatality rate went up and
down but at a higher rate than the previous year. From 2004 to 2006, the fatality rate for
subway decreased, but it started to increase in 2007.

Figure 4.7 Total incident rate for subway and light Rail from 2002 to 2011.
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Figure 4.8 Total injury rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.

Figure 4.9 Total fatality rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.

For figure 4.10, the passenger injuries rate per million PMT for Light Rail is
much higher than the rate for Subway. From 2003 to 2005, the passenger injury rate
increased for Light Rail; the rate started to decrease between 2005 and 2006. However,
the passenger injury rate started to increase after 2006, and now passengers have the
highest rate of getting injured ever before. For the Subway, the injury rate was almost
constant until 2007 where it started to increase but at a lower rate than the Light Rail.
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For Figure 4.11, the passenger fatality rate per PMT for Light Rail is higher than
the Subway. From 2003 to 2006, there were a big jump the in passenger fatality rate for
Light Rail but come to be lower than Subway after 2006 and stay lower until 2011. It
means that from 2006 to 2011, passengers had higher risk of getting killed by the Subway
than the Light Rail; however, the average passenger fatality rate per Million PMT per
year for Light Rail was 0.0004 while the average rate for Subway was 0.0003 per year.

Figure 4.10 Total passenger injury rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.
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Figure 4.11 Total passenger fatality rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.

The Suicide rate plays a big part of the fatalities for the Subway system. For over
10 years in these analyses we found that 173 people commit suicide from Subway
compare to 21 people from Light Rail. It is a little bit over 8:1 ratio. The suicide that
caused injuries from 2002 to 2011 is still higher for Subway compare to Light Rail. It is
important to notice that National Transit Database, there are no reports for suicide from
2002 to 2007. It is arguable that the increased number of fatalities due to suicide in the
subway might represent an anomaly. It is difficult to mitigate against a potential suicide,
nor is that the sole determinant of safety policy.
Suicide has been reported as an important cause of rail accidents. According to
FTA (2009), suicide is a major cause of heavy rail accidents but is not a major cause of
accident in light rail system. Between 2003 and 2005 some 200 suicide accidents
occurred in the heavy rail but only 24 suicide accidents occurred in light rail system
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(FTA 2006). The possible reason is the speed of heavy rail that attracts the suicide
attempters.
When comparing the suicide rate that end up in injury and fatality, the author
concluded that NTD did not start to pay attention to it until 2008. Figure 4.12 illustrated
that between 2008 and 2009 the suicide injury rate for light rail decreased but there were
a big increase from 2009 to 2010. There was a small decrease from 2010 to 2011. The
subway suicide injury rate increased from 2008 to 2010 but started to decrease from
2010.
For Figure 4.13, the suicide fatality for light rail has been increased since 2008,
but it increased from 2008 to 2009, decreased from 2009 to 2010 and increased again
from 2010 to 2011 for subway. Prior to 2008, the transit agencies did not have to report
the number of suicide. Based on the accident, the agencies reported suicide as trespasser
or other. After 2008 the system changed on how suicide needed to report. The agencies
started reporting suicide as suicide. But when NTD gets the information, the data has to
be clear. If the information is not clear, the agencies would need to have witnesses on site
that can testify the accident is actually a suicide otherwise NTD would report it as other.
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Figure 4.12 Total suicide injury rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.

Figure 4.13 Total suicide fatality rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.
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One of the major issues in the rail system is trespasser. From 2003 to 2004 the
trespasser injury rate for light rail was doubled. It decreased in 2005 and increased again
from 2005 to 2007. For subway, the trespasser rate decreased from 2002 to 2004; it
stayed at a low rate since 2004 until it reached zero in 2008. The trespasser fatality rate
went up and down from 2002 to 2008 for both systems. It came to the author’s attention
that from 2008 to 2011, the trespasser rate for both systems was zero but the suicide rate
was up. (See Figures 4.14 and 4.15)After 2008, the way, that the trespasser used to
reported, has changed. The transit agencies started to report trespassers as other or
pedestrians crossing the tracks or walking along the tracks.

Figure 4.14 Total trespasser injury rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.
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Figure 4.15 Total trespasser fatality rate for subway and light rail from 2002 to 2011.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary Analysis
Transit incidents, fatalities and injuries vary considerably from year to year, especially
when viewed alone, without consideration of the volume of ridership. However, the true
pictures of transit safety for various modes start to emerge when the simple accident or
fatality numbers are converted into various operating contexts. As shown in Figure 4.7,
the accident rate, injury rate and fatality rate per million PMT for LRT are consistently
higher than those of subway. The clear difference is highlighted by converting the total
number of accidents, injuries and fatalities into a unique platform or consistent unit. This
conclusion is also consistent with general expectations as subway usually operates in
exclusive right-of-way but LRT is in mixed traffic, which has higher risk exposure. The
simple process presented in this manuscript demonstrates that it is possible to derive
reasonable and consistent safety performance measures in order to compare different
transportation, especially transit, modes. It is clear that the total number of accidents or
injuries may vary from year to year and the operations may grow at different rates. When
a common denominator, such as an accident rate per million PMT, is used, it is much
easier to compare the safety performance of different modes.
From the figures of total incidents, fatalities and injuries per million passenger
miles traveled by each mode, there is a trend that can be found. Though passenger fatality
rate caused by subway and light rail were closely similar which 0.0004 average passenger
fatality rate per year for light rail and 0.0003 average passenger fatality rate
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per year for subway, total incident rate, passenger injury rate, total injury rate and total
fatalities rate caused by light rail were much higher than the one caused by the subway.
From 2006 to 2011, in Figure 4.7 shows that when there is an incident happened related
to light rail or subway, the risk that it will lead to death to passengers is higher in subway
compared to light rail.
Overall, subway is much safer than light rail in the aspects of risk of incidents,
injuries and fatalities rate. The number of total incidents injuries and fatalities for subway
are much higher than the ones for light rail, but when you compare their rate, the subway
has the lower risk. This analysis proves that when comparing the two dominant modes of
transportation in the US that subways are safer than Light Rail. Subways have dedicated
rights of ways, signal dedication and infrastructure that is totally separate from any other
mode of transport. Subways do have an overall higher fatality number but, that is due part
to subways having larger capacities for users. When an accident occurs, the probability of
injury or fatality will be higher.

Most light rail fatalities tend to be not passengers, but individuals in other
categories, such as illegal trespassers, suicide and motorists that violate safety laws or
regulations. Also, though the passenger injury is a major component of all injuries,
passenger fatalities caused by subway does not take a big part in total fatalities. To some
extent, it shows that subway passengers face a lower risk of death and incidents and
injuries per Million PMT compared to light rail passengers
As a result of accidents, injuries and fatalities, various controls have been put in
place to minimize as much as possible the probabilities of accidents occurring. Safety

55
training, safety commissions, safety campaigns, awareness training, periodic workshops
for continuous improvement are some of the ways United State Transit is working to
ensure that their employees and passengers are engrained with a culture of safety.
Through fundamental positive changes in safety performance, the transit agency can
adapt and grow and continue to enhance their reputation.

5.2 Safety Performance of Light Rail versus Subway
To compare the safety performance of light rail and subway system, it is important to
take into account a number of factors defining safety performance. One very popular way
of defining safety performance is to examine the frequency of accidents. In the present
study, when comparison was made between total accidents of subway and light rail
system two very important trend were observed. From 2002 to 2005, there were a lot of
accidents occurring in the light rail system, but 2006 saw a remarkable decline in
accident occurrence and from that year, though there is continuous increase in the total
number of light rail accidents, the situation is not as bad as was earlier. The decline in the
accident rate in 2006 can be attributed to the safety action plan introduced by FTA in the
same year that placed the reduction of collision to be its first priority. A closer view on
the number of accidents from 2003 to 2008 with respect to accident type is shown in
Figure 5.1 below. As can be seen, the decline in the number of accident in 2006 was
mainly due to the decline in the number of collisions (FTA 2009).
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Figure 5.1 Number of accidents by accident type (2003-2008).
Source: FTA, 2009, p. 4
* Other accidents include suicide and trespassing-related fatalities; homicides; non-fire -related
evacuations; and other fatality or multiple-injury accidents that are not considered Collisions,
Derailments, or Fires

Also, the data on frequency of accidents clearly shows that the increase in the
number of heavy rail accidents is at much higher level than the increase in the number of
light rail accidents. This might be due to the higher capacity of the heavy trains and its
high speed because of which the chances of injuries and fatalities in an incident increases.
After reviewing the data from 2003 to 2008, FTA (2009) reported that in total some 348
people died in heavy rail accidents while only 139 died in rail road accidents, showing
that there were more than double deaths caused by heavy rail accidents than by light rail
accidents despite the fact that the number of accidents in light rail (2747) was much
higher than the number of accidents in heavy rail (918).
The major cause of these accidents was found to be suicide (FTA 2009). Also, the
large number of fatalities in heavy rail accidents is mainly due to suicide. Table 5.1
below shows the number of fatalities and injuries caused by traffic accidents that
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occurred due to suicide. It clearly shows the increase in the suicide rates in past few
years. This explains the growing rate of accidents as well as fatalities of heavy rail
accidents in past few years.

Table 5.1 Fatalities and Injuries in Traffic Accidents due to Suicide
Year

Total number of fatalities

Total number of injuries

2002

15

18

2003

15

11

2004

16

0

2005

7

0

2006

12

27

2007

23

16

2008

27

15

2009

49

23

2010

52

39

2011

79

38

The present study has also compared the number of fatalities or injuries occurred
in the accidents of these two rail systems from 2002 through 2011. This measure can be
used to benchmark the severity of accidents. According to the data reported by NTA,
light rail is safer mode of transport as there are very few fatalities in light rail accidents,
though the number of injuries is quite equal in both mode of transport. Thus, when taken
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into account the large capacity of users in subway system, it appears to have much lesser
safety risk then in light rail system. According to FTA (2009), most of the people that die
in these accidents are non-passenger publics including the motorists, trespasser and
patrons.
Turning to the specific factors with respect to both rail system and their
relationship with the accident rates and frequencies, evidence is clear that numerous
factors play roles in accident occurrences. Some of these factors are equally applicable to
both light and heavy rail system but some factors are specifically associated with the
accident occurrence in either light rail or heavy rail system.
According to “2009 Rail Safety Statistical Report” (FTA 2009), there is
noticeable difference in the accidents rates of light rail and heavy rail system with respect
to the type of accidents. In heavy rail system the rate of rail grade collision is very low
and remained below 0.02 throughout 2003-2008. However, rail grade crossing collisions
is the most common cause of accidents in light rail system and there is a significant rise
in the rail grade collisions from 2003 to 2008 (16.78 to 26.32). In comparison, the rate of
accidents caused by suicide, trespassing-related fatalities, homicides and other factors not
including collisions, derailments and fires is very high in heavy rail system, reaching
around 1.03 in 2007. Such factors play not much important role in the light rail accidents
where rail grade collision or non-rail grade collisions are the main type of accidents. A
previous report by FTA (2006) has also reported collision to be the major cause of
accidents, deaths and injuries in light rail system.
Several reasons have been identified leading to such accidents. In general, traffic
safety literature has reported negligence from the rail operator’s side to be the prime
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cause of traffic accidents. Evans (2004), for example, summarizes the findings of two
large independent studies undertaken in the U.S. and U.K. In both studies driver behavior
was found to be either the sole or contributing cause of more than 90% of crashes.
Wilson and Norris (2006) reviewed a number of studies specifically on rail accidents and
also reported rail operator’s behavior including attentiveness, care, recognition of signals,
and ability to make right decision with respect to the signals as important factors related
to rail accidents. Similarly Hursh, Fanzone and Raslear (2011) found a strong and
significant relationship between the level of rail operator’s fatigue and the frequency and
severity of rail accidents.
Studies not only focused on the behavior of rail operators and other workers of
rail agencies but found passenger behavior to be another important cause of such
accidents. FTA (2009) reported that in all the passenger fatalities between 2003 to 2008
in rail accidents were due to the factors associated with either passenger-behavior, of
which some 43% accidents were due to medical problems with the passenger and 21%
were found to be slip and fall accidents. However, it is important to note that all these
passenger fatalities were caused by the heavy rail accidents except one in which case a
passenger died by slipping from the light rail. Passenger behavior was also found to be
one major cause of accidents that led to public (non-passenger) fatalities (FTA 2009)
Risky action taken by motorists is found to be one of the major causes of rail
grade crossing collisions and, in many of these accidents, it is the motorists who die.
Private automobiles drivers and public bus drivers must understand that by doing
anything risky around a heavy rail line or light rail can led to their death.
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The other important causes were identified as vehicle failures (e.g., brakes and
tires), environmental factors (e.g, weather and lighting), and roadway factors (e.g., design
and condition). The vehicle-specific attributes that are known to influence rail accident
risk include vehicle age, model year, and configuration. Older vehicles and old models
have been reported to be over- represented in crashes relative to the newer models
(Zeegeret al. 1994; Chang &Yeh 2005). Failure of safety equipment is another important
cause of rail accidents, in particular derailment and fire accidents. According to FTA
(2009) some 80 derailment accidents and some 89 fire accidents in rail were occurred due
to equipment failure.
Change in weather or climate condition can also led to rail road traffic accidents
but it is a relatively less important factor because the number of accident caused by this
factor are relatively very low. From 1995 to 2005 only 861 railroad accidents, including
all modes or rail traffic, occurred due to weather condition (Rossetti, n.d.). However,
indirectly these weather conditions can play a significant role in accident causation. For
instance, floods and flash floods produce damage on rail tracks, high temperature in
summer can develop heat kinks in railroad tracks, cold temperate can result in blockage
of train lines, thunderstorm can cause damage to safety equipment, and other similar
issues (Rossetti 2002)
Rossetti (n.d.) also looked into the frequency of the rail accidents with respect to
the time of day and found that in all rail accidents that occurred between 1995 to 2005,
most of the accidents occurred from early afternoon to evening (Around 2:00 p.m. to 6
p.m., as shown in Figure 5.2). In most of these cases the reason was found to be high
temperature.
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Figure 5.2 Effect of Time of day on the cause and frequency of occurrence of rail
accidents in US during 1995-2005
Source: Rossetti, M.A. (n.d.). Analysis of Weather Events on US Railroads.
Cambridge, MA: Volpe National Transportation System Center

Railroad crossings are reported to the main site of collision accidents. A recent
study has found that the main cause of collisions at railroad crossing in the light rail
system is the illegal and abrupt turns made by the motor vehicle drivers in front of
approaching light rail (Ogden et al. 2007). It was found that the turning traffic is often
controlled through left and right turn arrow signal which might not be an appropriate way
to inform them about the approaching light rail. The study suggests a number of measures
like flashing light signals, automatic gates, and audible signals in form of bell or horn (as
light rail are not much noisy) for motorists safety. Also, the study gives importance to the
safety of pedestrians and suggests use of fencing, swing gates, pedestrian barriers,
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pavement markings and texturing, refuge areas, and fixed message signs for pedestrian
safety. However, BNSF (n.d.) reported that more than half of grade crossing collisions on
BNSF in 2010 were on the grade collision where there were active flashing light signals
as well as automatic doors. This indicates the need of more measures like a system to
ensure the compliance of motor vehicle rules in these crossing and reduction of at-grade
crossings.
The data indicate continual increase after 2007 in the frequency of accidents,
injuries and fatalities in both mode of system, though at different rates. A particular
reason for this has not yet been identified but it could be due to the increase in the
number of passenger and vehicles miles as well as vehicle revenue hours. All these
factors show increase in the railroad operation indicating the need to analyze the rail
safety taking into consideration the number of passenger as well as miles travel by each
mode of rail transport.
5.3 Policy Implications
From this extensive and detailed review of statistical and research data on the safety
performance of light and heavy rails system, it can be concluded that both modes of
transport pose a different type of threat. Light rail that has been reported in previous
studies to be a safer mode of transport is found to be more risky than subway system.
Although the number of fatalities and injuries are much lesser in light rail system, it is
mainly because of the low speed and low capacity for passengers. With limited number
of passengers travelling in light rail, it is not surprising that in case of accident there is
low probability of fatality or injury.
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Collision between light rail and other automobiles have been found to be the
major type of accidents in light rail. One main cause of such collisions in the light rail
system is because it does not have its own right of way and it travels along with other
vehicles on the road. Also, many of these collisions occur at rail road crossing. Safety
policies for ensuring the decrease in number of collision can make the light rail the safest
mode of travelling in future.
The policy makers must understand that the chances of fatality are much higher in
the subway system as compared to light rail system due to high speed of heavy rail and
the higher capacity for passengers. Although with the large number of passengers
travelling through heavy rail system made the percentage of fatalities with respect to total
number of passenger quite low, it is important to understand that the life of every single
person is important and efforts must be made to make the heavy rail system even more
secure for passengers and for public.
The study has found that the human factor particularly driver and passenger risky
behavior and worker fatigue critically affect the occurrence of accidents. Important
measures to be taken for reducing the workers behavioral problems causing rail accidents
were found to be reduction in the work load over employees of rail agencies,
development of official training program on safety and security particularly for rail
operators, selection of rail operator after their behavioral analysis, and development of
safety culture in the organizations. Public education program needs to be introduced as
well to make general public aware of the safety measures they should take while
travelling through rail or crossing the rail line.
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The present study has created new directions for the future research on safety
performance of rail system. First, it highlights the importance of human factor and
encourages the future researcher to compare different modes of rail system or traffic to
see the relative importance of human factors in occurrence of accidents. Second, the
study has compared the safety performance of just mode of transportation. Future
comparative studies should include commuter rail as well as other mode of transport to
find out the safety performance of transport in USA. It is also important to note that the
previous method of measuring safety performance through number of accidents, injuries
and fatalities is proved by the present study to give only partial view on safety
performance. A comprehensive view including rate of accident, injuries and fatalities
with respect to, capacity, passenger and vehicle miles and other similar factors gives
more reliable findings on the subject.

5.4 Recommendations
The researcher has gained a lot of knowledge about the factors causing the occurrence of
accidents in both light rail system and in subway system. In this section, suggestions have
been made to avoid those causal factors to ensure safety and security for railway workers
and passengers as well as general public.
For light rail safety plan, there should be increased emphasis on the reduction of
railroad grade crossing – the main site of accident occurrence. One very important
recommendation for reducing the collision between light rail and other vehicles is to
install necessary signs on the road for informing the motor driver in advance about the
approaching railroad crossing or light rail line. Since light rail shares the road with other
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vehicles, it is important that the route of light rails should be developed in a way that the
motorist or pedestrian coming from the side roads can see the approaching light rail.
Also, some laws need to be made for reducing the number of rail road crossings. The
study also recommends development of a rail grade crossing safety management system
that not only takes care of the maintenance of railroad crossing safety equipment but also
ensures the enforcement of traffic rules in such crossings. Measures needs to be taken at
community level to make people, particularly motor drivers, understand the importance
of following traffic rules at rail grade crossing for their own safety. Some public
education program should specifically focus on how a motorist can confirm that it will be
safe to cross the road when there is a light rail approaching.
Since subway system poses higher risk of death or injury in case of accidents, it is
important that the any safety management plan must give priority to the reduction of
heavy train accidents. For reduction of derailment accidents, proper and timely
maintenance of vehicle as well as safety management equipment is needed. However, one
important cause of growing fatalities in heavy rail accidents are suicide relating to the
growing suicide rates in the country. Reduction of suicide rate is beyond the control of
rail agencies but they can take measure to reduce the use of heavy rail system for suicide.
The study recommends that for reduction of suicide heavy rail accidents, a thorough
research must be conducted to determine the most common ways these suicide attempts
were made in the past and then take practical measures to reduce the probability of
occurrence of those common methods of suicide. For instance, if most of the suicide
accidents occurred when a person jumped in front of train, the agencies must add fences
around rail line. Fences can also reduce the occurrence of collisions accidents.
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